SUPREME COURT: CASTE ABUSE UTTERED INSIDE A CLOSED ROOM IS NOT AN OFFENCE UNDER THE SC/ST ACT

Ramkrishna Chauhan v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr |2026 LiveLaw (SC) 837
The Supreme Court has held that caste-based abuse hurled at a person inside an enclosed space, with no members of the public present to see or hear it, does not attract the offence of insult or intimidation “in public view” under the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989. A bench of Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta quashed proceedings under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act against a school manager accused of assaulting and casteist abuse, while allowing the parallel criminal case under general penal law to continue.
Background of the Dispute
The case arose out of a school-level altercation. Two students got into a quarrel, prompting the father of one of them to approach the school manager. According to the complainant, the manager, along with members of the school staff, assaulted him and hurled caste-based abuses at him. This led to registration of an FIR invoking Sections 147, 323, 342 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code (now corresponding provisions of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023), read with Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act. A chargesheet followed and the trial court took cognisance.
Notably, a cross-FIR was lodged the same day by the manager’s wife, alleging that the complainant had assaulted and abused her in the school office and that the manager had only intervened to protect her before being assaulted himself. Cognisance was taken in that case too.
The manager challenged the summoning order before the Allahabad High Court, arguing that the SC/ST Act charges could not stand. The High Court declined to interfere, holding that the fact the case might be a counterblast to the cross-FIR was not, by itself, a ground for quashing and that the material on record disclosed a prima facie case.
Arguments Before the Supreme Court
Before the Supreme Court, the Appellant argued that the High Court had wrongly concluded that the alleged incident took place within public view. He pointed out that none of the witness statements placed anyone else inside the room at the time of the alleged abuse and that the room itself had no window and no public access. He further submitted that the FIR did not specifically attribute any caste-based utterance to him and that he did not even have prior knowledge of the complainant’s caste. The Respondent, on the other hand, supported the High Court’s finding that the incident had occurred within public view and that sufficient material existed to sustain the charge.
What the Court Held
The central question before the bench was whether the record showed that the alleged caste-based abuse was uttered at a place “within public view,” a statutory requirement for offences under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s). Drawing on its earlier rulings in Karuppudayar v. State and Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand, the Court reiterated the settled position that a place is “within public view” only where members of the public are actually present and able to witness or hear the utterance. If the alleged incident occurs within four walls, away from public presence, that requirement is not satisfied, regardless of how public the location might otherwise be.
Applying this standard, the bench found that the FIR nowhere stated that the abuses were spoken in the presence or hearing of the public. It also noted a deeper gap in the prosecution’s case: neither the FIR nor the complainant’s own statement contained any specific allegation of caste-based abuse. At best, the material showed a quarrel and physical scuffle between the parties, without any casteist utterance attributable to the Appellant.
The Court also examined statements given by school teachers who were cited as witnesses. While they spoke of an altercation and scuffle, none of them claimed to have been present when the caste-based abuse was allegedly uttered or to have heard it themselves. Their general presence on the school premises, the Court held, was not enough to establish that the utterance occurred within public view.
The bench was careful to clarify the limited nature of judicial scrutiny at the cognisance stage; a court is not expected to conduct a detailed appreciation of evidence at that point. Even so, it held that the basic ingredients of the offence must be discernible from the material on record and in this case they were not.
Conclusion
Concluding that the essential ingredients of the SC/ST Act offences were not made out even prima facie, the Supreme Court set aside the Allahabad High Court’s judgment and quashed the proceedings under the Act against the Appellant. It clarified, however, that the criminal proceedings under the general penal provisions would continue unaffected.
Shomdeepta Chanda
Associate
The Indian Lawyer & Allied Services

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