SUPREME COURT HOLDS THAT RULES OF LIMITATION ARE GROUNDED IN PUBLIC POLICY AND EQUITY, ENSURING THAT THE ‘SWORD OF DAMOCLES’ DOES NOT HANG OVER A LITIGANT INDEFINITELY

A two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court comprising of Justice J.B.Pardiwala and Justice R.Mahadevan passed a Judgment dated 08-01-2025 in the matter of H.Guruswamy & Ors vs. A. Krishnaiah since deceased by Lrs, Civil Appeal No. 317 of 2025 and observed that if a party loses the right to have a matter considered on merits due to prolonged inaction, the delay cannot be assumed non-deliberate. They cannot argue that substantial justice should override technicalities in such cases. When considering a plea for condonation of delay, the Court must first assess the bona fides of the explanation provided, without delving into the merits of the main case.

FACTS:

1. That the aforesaid Appeal was filed before the Apex Court by one, H. Guruswamy & Ors (Appellants) against one A. Krishnaiah since deceased by Lrs (Respondent), who challenged the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru (High Court) dated 30.01.2020 in Misc. First Appeal No. 7220 of 2014 filed under Order 43 Rule 1(d) of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (the CPC), by which the Order dated 05.08.2014 passed in Misc. Case No. 223 of 2006 on the file of the XIV Additional City Civil Judge, Bengaluru (Lower Court) rejecting the Application filed under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC came to be set aside and thereby the Appeal was allowed.
2. The dispute arises from a protracted litigation involving the property bearing Sy. No. 1/11 in Byrasandra, Bangalore. Venkatappa originally owned the property in 1916, which was later divided through a registered family partition between Venkatappa and his brother Muniga @ Chikonu. Venkatappa retained a portion, while Chikonu received another. Over time, disputes among family members and third parties led to multiple rounds of litigation.
3. In 1971, a suit (O.S. No. 33/1971) was filed by C.R. Narayana Reddy for specific performance concerning the Property. During this litigation, the deceased Respondent, A. Krishnaiah, was impleaded as Defendant No. 14, claiming to have purchased the Property from other Defendants. The Court concluded that his purchase was not bona fide and was barred by the doctrine of lis pendens.
4. Despite this, Krishnaiah filed another suit (O.S. No. 104/1972) seeking similar reliefs. This suit was dismissed on merits in 1975, reiterating that Krishnaiah’s claim was untenable. Subsequently, he filed O.S. No. 603/1977 (later renumbered as O.S. No. 1833/1980) for possession and other reliefs. This suit was dismissed for default in 1983 but restored in 1984 upon his Application.
5. A significant development occurred in 1999 when Defendant No. 4, Nagaraja, passed away. The Respondents failed to substitute Nagaraja’s legal heirs despite several opportunities in 2000. Consequently, O.S. No. 1833/1980 was dismissed as abated on 22.08.2000.
6. In 2006, the Respondents filed Misc. Case No. 223/2006, seeking to Recall the abatement and restore the Suit. They cited delays caused by the health issues of one of the Respondents, Smt. Jayalakshmi G., who had undergone angioplasty. The Trial Court rejected this Application on 05.08.2014, citing:

1. The Respondents failed to provide sufficient cause for their delay.
2. The litigation was barred by res judicata due to the dismissal of earlier suits.
3. The Application for Recall was filed after an inordinate delay of six years.
4. The Respondents were found to have abused the process of law by repeatedly filing suits on the same cause of action.
5. The Respondents challenged this order before the Karnataka High Court through P. No. 7220/2014. The High Court condoned the delay of over 2200 days and revived the Suit. Aggrieved by this, the Appellants approached the Supreme Court, arguing that the High Court ignored critical findings, including the doctrine of lis pendens, res judicata, and the Respondent’s lack of bona fide actions.

TRIAL COURT:

The Trial Court noted that the rights of the deceased Respondent (A. Krishnaiah) had already been conclusively decided in O.S. No. 33/1971 and O.S. No. 104/1972. In those cases, the Courts found that the deceased Respondent was not a bona fide purchaser and was not entitled to any relief concerning the property. The repeated litigation on the same cause of action rendered the current suit barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

The Respondents failed to demonstrate any sufficient cause for the significant delay in filing their Application for Recall. The Trial Court observed that there was an inordinate delay of approximately six years in seeking the Recall of abatement, and the explanation provided by the Respondents lacked credibility.

The Court highlighted that the Respondents obtained the certified copies of the order dated 22.08.2000, on 26.08.2005, but filed their Recall Application only on 06.03.2006. The delay in filing the petition remained unexplained.

The Trial Court found that the reasons cited for the delay, such as health issues of Smt. Jayalakshmi G., were not adequately substantiated and appeared doubtful.

The Court concluded that the Respondents had not approached the court with clean hands and were attempting to abuse the judicial process by repeatedly initiating litigation over a matter that had already been decided.

The Trial Court held that the Application for Recall was barred by limitation, and the Respondents had failed to meet the legal threshold for condoning such an extraordinary delay.

The Court noted that the Respondents were educated individuals and could have obtained the certified copies of the required orders and acted promptly. Their inaction and negligence over the years could not be excused.

HIGH COURT:

The High Court emphasized the need to adopt a liberal and justice-oriented approach. It held that the delay of approximately 2200 days in filing the Recall Application should be condoned to ensure that substantial justice was done between the Parties.

The High Court took into account the health issues of one of the Respondents, Smt. Jayalakshmi G., who had undergone angioplasty, as a factor contributing to the delay. It treated this as a sufficient cause for the Respondents’ failure to act within the prescribed time.

The High Court observed that the suit had been pending since 1977 (later renumbered as O.S. No. 1833/1980) and had faced procedural hurdles over the years. The Court appeared inclined to revive the suit to allow its adjudication on merits.

The High Court exercised its discretionary power to condone the delay, emphasizing the need to avoid technicalities that could prevent the resolution of disputes.

The High Court reasoned that condoning the delay and restoring the suit would not cause significant prejudice to the Appellants, as the matter would still be decided on merits.

The High Court underscored that procedural rules, including those related to limitation, should not be used to obstruct the delivery of substantial justice.

SUPREME COURT:

The Court emphasized the substantial delay of approximately 2200 days in filing the Recall Application. It observed that the Respondents failed to provide a credible explanation for this delay, and their reasons lacked bona fide justification.

The Court noted that the Respondents had engaged in repeated litigation over the same cause of action, despite earlier adverse findings. It highlighted that the doctrine of res judicata applied, as the matter had been conclusively decided in prior suits, including O.S. No. 33/1971 and O.S. No. 104/1972.

The Court underscored that rules of limitation are founded on principles of sound public policy and equity. They are intended to prevent dilatory tactics and ensure that disputes are resolved promptly. It cautioned that Courts must not adopt an overly liberal approach that undermines these principles.

The Court criticized the High Court for overlooking the procedural lapses and allowing the Recall Application without adequately considering the findings of the Trial Court. It stated that while courts should strive to achieve substantial justice, this cannot come at the expense of well-established legal principles and procedural rules.

The Court reiterated the findings in earlier suits, particularly O.S. No. 33/1971, where the deceased Respondent was deemed not to be a bona fide purchaser. It pointed out that the Respondents had abused the process of law by initiating multiple suits despite these clear findings.

The Court observed that the Respondents had been given multiple opportunities to substitute legal heirs after the death of a defendant in 1999 but failed to act. Their negligence and callous attitude contributed to the abatement of the Suit.

CONCLUSION:

The Court expressed strong disapproval of the High Court’s decision to condone such an extraordinary delay without proper justification. It held that the High Court exhibited a lack of judicial restraint and failed to consider the principles governing limitation and procedural fairness.

The Court clarified that procedural rules are not merely technical but serve a substantive purpose. While merits are important, the Respondents’ repeated inaction and abuse of the judicial process could not be ignored.

 

Sakshi Raghuvanshi

Senior Legal Associate

The Indian Lawyer

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