WHEN A TECHNICAL OBJECTION CANNOT UNDO A COMPLETED TRIAL

INTRODUCTION

In Sanu Varghese v. Shoukkathali, 2026 INSC 1053, the Supreme Court of India considered an important question arising out of a cheque dishonour case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The Judgment was delivered on 22 September 2026 by a Bench comprising Justice J.B. Pardiwala and Justice K. Vinod Chandran.

The case mainly concerned the question of whether a trial should be sent back for fresh consideration on a procedural ground when the Accused had not claimed that any prejudice had been caused to him. The Supreme Court ultimately set aside the High Court’s Remand Order and restored the matter for consideration on its other merits.

BRIEF FACTS

The Appellant, Sanu Varghese, was the Complainant in a proceeding under Section 138 of the NI Act. The Respondent, Shoukkathali, was the Accused.

The Trial Court had already completed the trial. During his evidence, the Accused appeared as DW-1 and stated that he had given a signed blank cheque as security for a loan of Rs. 10 lakhs. According to him, the cheque was later presented for Rs. 30 lakhs. He also disputed the Complainant’s presence on certain dates relevant to the alleged transaction.

The Magistrate, however, noted that the Accused had not produced substantive evidence to establish that the Complainant was actually unavailable. The Court observed that the Accused could have obtained the Complainant’s Call Data Records to support his claim.

The High Court, while hearing the matter in Revision, remanded the case for a fresh trial from the stage of defence evidence. The High Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in M/s Mandvi Cooperative Bank Limited v. Nimesh B. Thakore.

ISSUES

The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether the High Court was justified in ordering a remand at the stage of revision when the Accused had not claimed that the procedure followed during the trial had caused him any prejudice.

A related question was how the earlier decision in Mandvi Cooperative Bank should be applied in a case where the trial had already been completed.

ANALYSIS

The Supreme Court first examined Section 145 of the NI Act and the earlier decision in Mandvi Cooperative Bank. Section 145 permits the Complainant’s evidence to be given by way of affidavit. However, if either the Prosecution or the Accused applies for the person giving evidence to be called for examination, that request has to be allowed.

The Court also noted the distinction between the evidence of the Complainant and that of the Accused in cheque dishonour proceedings. The defence may need to rely upon different kinds of evidence to rebut the statutory presumption relating to the cheque. This was one of the reasons discussed in the earlier Judgment for not permitting the Accused to give evidence by affidavit.

But the Supreme Court said that the principle had to be applied while keeping in mind the prejudice caused to the Accused in a completed trial. That aspect was important in the present case.

The Accused had never complained before the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court that he had suffered any prejudice. The Supreme Court therefore found it difficult to justify reopening the completed trial on a point which had not caused any demonstrated prejudice to the Accused.

There was another important circumstance. The Accused had admitted his signature on the cheque. The Court observed that the statutory presumption therefore applied, and the same had not been rebutted.

The Supreme Court also considered the Respondent’s argument that the trial had subsequently been resumed from the stage of defence evidence and completed. The Court held that this did not affect its decision to set aside the High Court’s Order. The other grounds available to the Respondent could still be considered by the High Court.

One practical point in the Order is also worth noticing. The Supreme Court directed that the evidence which had originally been recorded at the trial would alone be considered. If the Trial Court had subsequently examined the Accused in person, that later evidence was to be left out of consideration.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court allowed the Appeal and set aside the High Court’s Remand Order. The Criminal Revision was restored to the High Court for consideration on its own merits.

The decision is significant because it shows that a procedural objection cannot automatically result in reopening a completed criminal trial. The Court looked at the matter in the context of actual prejudice to the Accused, rather than treating the procedural point in isolation.

SARTHAK KALRA

Senior Legal Associate

The Indian Lawyer & Allied Services

Editor’s Comment

In cheque dishonour cases, where proceedings are already subject to statutory presumptions and can involve lengthy trials, this approach has practical importance. A party seeking a remand cannot merely point to a procedural issue; the question of what prejudice was actually caused remains important.

Sushila Ram Varma

Advocate and Chief Consultant

The Indian Lawyer & Allied Services

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