WHEN VIGILANCE FADES: A JUDICIAL TREATISE ON DUTY, DELAY AND EXECUTION SALE

INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s decision in G.R. Selvaraj (Dead) through LRs. v. K.J. Prakash Kumar & Ors., 2025 INSC 1353, delivered on 25 November 2025 by Justice Sanjay Kumar and Justice Alok Aradhe, offers a detailed examination of the limits of judicial intervention in execution proceedings—particularly the effect of Order XXI Rule 90(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. The Court restored the validity of an auction sale conducted in 2002, overturning the Madras High Court’s 2009 Order and reaffirmed the mandatory duty of Judgment Debtors to act vigilantly during execution stages.

BRIEF FACTS
The litigation began with a money suit filed in 1995 by Rasheeda Yasin, alleging that the Defendants—Komala Ammal and her son K.J. Prakash Kumar—along with the deceased K. Jagannathan, had jointly borrowed ₹2,00,000 on 02.03.1992. The Suit was decreed ex parte on 16.04.1997, awarding the Plaintiff ₹3,75,000 with interest and costs.
In execution proceedings, the Judgment Debtors repeatedly sought extensions and made partial appearances, but their failure to comply led to attachment of their residential property—measuring 2120 sq. ft. at Choolai, Chennai. Between 1999 and 2002, several attempts were made to auction the property. With each failed auction, the Decree Holder applied for reduction of the upset price and notices were repeatedly served. The Judgment Debtors participated at certain stages but later remained absent, leading to multiple ex parte orders reducing the upset price.
Finally, on 12.09.2002, the auction was completed and G.R. Selvaraj emerged as the successful purchaser at ₹11,03,000. A Sale Certificate was issued on 10.01.2003. The Judgment Debtors then filed an application under Order XXI Rule 90 CPC, alleging material irregularity—primarily the reduction of upset price. This was dismissed by the Executing Court in 2004 and the dismissal was affirmed in appeal in 2007.
However, in 2009, the Madras High Court allowed a revision petition and set aside the auction sale, reasoning that the Executing Court failed to consider whether sale of only part of the property would suffice to satisfy the decree. The auction Purchaser’s legal representatives then approached the Supreme Court.

ISSUES OF LAW
The Supreme Court identified the central legal issue as follows:
1) Whether Order XXI Rule 90(3) CPC bars judgment debtors from challenging an auction sale on a ground—such as the need to sell only part of the property—that they could have raised before the proclamation of sale was drawn up.
2) Whether the High Court was justified in overlooking the statutory bar under Rule 90(3) by relying on precedents delivered under the unamended CPC.
3) Whether the judgment debtors, despite receiving multiple notices and participating earlier, could later claim absence of notice or irregularity.

ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court engaged in a detailed doctrinal analysis of Order XXI Rule 90 CPC, beginning with its evolution. It noted that earlier precedents like Ambati Narasayya v. Subba Rao and Takkaseela Pedda Subba Reddi—relied on by the High Court—were delivered before the introduction of sub-rule (3) in 1977. Under the pre-amendment regime, any material irregularity could be raised even belatedly, provided substantial injury was shown.
However, after the 1976 Amendment, Rule 90(3) imposed a clear statutory bar: no ground can be taken to set aside a sale if it could have been raised earlier, i.e., before the proclamation was finalized. The Court emphasised that this Amendment fundamentally changed the legal landscape. The High Court thus erred in mechanically applying earlier precedents without accounting for this legislative shift.
The Court further held that the Judgment Debtors were indisputably served notices at every crucial phase—upset price reductions, sale proclamations and adjourned hearings. They participated initially, sought time, filed counters and later chose not to appear. Having thus been fully aware of the execution process, they could not later plead ignorance or irregularity. Their silence amounted to waiver. The Court cited its own earlier reasoning in Desh Bandhu Gupta, stressing that a party who had notice and failed to act cannot later assail the sale, even if the irregularity alleged relates to the scope of Rule 66(2)(a) CPC.
On the High Court’s conclusion that the Executing Court failed to consider the possibility of selling only a portion of the property, the Supreme Court held that such a plea was never raised by the Judgment Debtors during the execution proceedings. Therefore, Rule 90(3) barred them from raising it subsequently. The duty of the Executing Court under Rule 64 CPC to consider partial sale does not override the procedural bar when the Judgment Debtor—despite notice—fails to raise the issue at the appropriate time.
Ultimately, the Court restored the Executing Court’s Order and reinstated the finality of the sale conducted in 2002, observing that to reopen such a long-concluded transaction after 23 years would cause unwarranted disruption.

CONCLUSION
This Judgment reinforces the principle that execution proceedings demand vigilance, not passivity. Once notices are duly served, judgment debtors must raise all possible objections at the earliest stage. The protections under Order XXI Rule 90 are not meant for those who sleep over their rights and later attempt to unravel long-settled transactions. With lucid reasoning, the Supreme Court restores doctrinal consistency in execution jurisprudence, emphasizing that legislative amendments must be respected, procedural delays cannot be rewarded and auction purchasers are entitled to finality.

SARTHAK KALRA
Senior Legal Associate
The Indian Lawyer & Allied Services

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