THE SUPREME COURT ON THE EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF DYING DECLARATIONS
INTRODUCTION
In Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 2026 INSC 1196, (decided on 05 November 2026) the Supreme Court of India, comprising Justice Ujjal Bhuyan and Justice Atul S. Chandurkar, examined important questions concerning the reversal of an acquittal, the evidentiary value of inconsistent dying declarations and the circumstances in which an Accused can be convicted under Section 302 (Punishment for murder) of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, when the original charge was framed with the aid of Section 34 (Common Intention).
The Judgment reiterates a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that suspicion, however strong, cannot replace proof. It also emphasises that the Prosecution cannot shift its burden onto the Accused merely because an incident occurred within the confines of a household.
BRIEF FACTS
The case arose from the death of Sunitabai, who sustained severe burn injuries on 10 April 2005 and subsequently succumbed to those injuries on 15 April 2005. The Prosecution alleged that her Husband, Father-in-law, Mother-in-law (the Appellant) and Brother-in-law had subjected her to physical and mental cruelty on account of dowry demands and her inability to bear children. It was further alleged that all four Accused, acting with a common intention, had set her on fire.
The Prosecution relied primarily upon three statements made by the Deceased, including one recorded in the medico-legal case papers and two subsequent dying declarations. However, these statements contained material inconsistencies regarding who had actually set her on fire. The first dying declaration implicated the Appellant, whereas the subsequent two statements identified her Father-in-law as the person who had set the deceased on fire.
The Sessions Court acquitted all four Accused, finding that the Prosecution evidence suffered from serious inconsistencies and that an important Witness, Vishwas Patil, who had allegedly rescued the Deceased and taken her to the hospital, had not been examined.
On Appeal, the Bombay High Court reversed the acquittal of the Appellant and convicted her under Section 302 IPC, while maintaining the acquittal of the remaining Accused. Aggrieved by this decision, the Appellant approached the Supreme Court.
ISSUES OF LAW
- Whether an Accused charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC could be independently convicted under Section 302 IPC when no separate charge under the substantive provision had been framed.
- Whether a conviction could be sustained solely on the basis of one dying declaration when the other dying declarations contained material inconsistencies and the Prosecution had failed to examine a material Witness.
- Whether Section 106 (Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge) of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, could be invoked to draw an adverse inference against the Accused in the absence of the Prosecution first establishing a prima facie case.
- Whether the High Court was justified in reversing the acquittal recorded by the Sessions Court.
ANALYSIS OF THE JUDGMENT
One of the most significant aspects of the Judgment concerns the distinction between constructive liability under Section 34 IPC and individual criminal liability under Section 302 IPC. The Supreme Court observed that the original charge was against all four Accused for committing murder in furtherance of their common intention. However, the High Court acquitted three Accused and convicted the Appellant alone under Section 302 IPC, despite there being no independent charge against her under that provision.
Relying upon Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, the Court reiterated that where the Prosecution case is founded upon the common intention of several Accused, the acquittal of the other Accused cannot ordinarily be disregarded to sustain the conviction of one remaining Accused on the same factual foundation. Doing so, in the absence of a separate charge or evidence of participation with other persons, would amount to creating an entirely new case against the Accused. The Court held that such an approach would cause serious prejudice to the Appellant.
The Court also examined the evidentiary value of multiple dying declarations. Referring to Abhishek Sharma v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), it reiterated that each dying declaration must be examined independently, keeping in view its voluntariness, reliability, the mental fitness of the maker and the surrounding circumstances. Where material inconsistencies exist, the Court must carefully examine whether other evidence provides the necessary corroboration.
In the present case, the High Court relied upon the statement recorded in the medico-legal case papers while discarding the other two dying declarations. However, the Supreme Court found that the High Court had failed to adequately consider the absence of corroborative evidence. In particular, Vishwas Patil, who was allegedly the first person to reach the spot, extinguish the fire and take the Deceased to the hospital, was never examined. His testimony was material not merely to establish the circumstances in which the Deceased was rescued but also to clarify the circumstances surrounding the recording of the first statement.
Another important observation concerned Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The High Court had drawn an adverse inference against the Appellant because she had failed to explain how the Deceased sustained the burn injuries when both were allegedly present in the house. The Supreme Court rejected this approach, clarifying that Section 106 cannot be used to compensate for deficiencies in the Prosecution case. The initial burden of establishing the Accused’s involvement remains upon the Prosecution. Only after a prima facie case is established can the absence of a reasonable explanation become an additional circumstance against the Accused. The Court relied upon Anees v. State Govt. of NCT to reinforce this position.
Finally, the Supreme Court emphasised that an acquittal strengthens the existing presumption of innocence. An Appellate court may reverse an acquittal, but it must give due consideration to the reasoning adopted by the Trial Court. Unless the view taken by the Trial Court is perverse or legally unsustainable, interference is not justified merely because another interpretation of the evidence is possible. Accordingly, the Court found that the Sessions Court had taken a reasonable view of the evidence and that the High Court had failed to establish sufficient grounds for reversing the acquittal.
TRISHMA KASHYAP
Legal Associate
The Indian Lawyer & Allied Services
Editor’s Comments
The decision in Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil reinforces the safeguards that lie at the heart of a fair criminal trial. It makes clear that a Court cannot reconstruct the Prosecution’s case to sustain a conviction on a charge that was never independently framed. Equally, inconsistent dying declarations cannot be selectively relied upon without examining the surrounding circumstances and available corroborative evidence.
Perhaps the most important takeaway is the Court’s reminder that the burden of proving guilt cannot be shifted to an Accused simply because the Prosecution finds it difficult to explain the circumstances of an incident. By setting aside the High Court Judgment and acquitting the Appellant, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that criminal conviction must rest on legally sustainable charges and reliable evidence, not conjecture or an incomplete chain of circumstances.
Sushila Ram Varma
Advocate and Chief Consultant
The Indian Lawyer & Allied Services
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