1 (2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirect interference or attempt to interfere on the part of the candidate or his agent, or of any other person 7 [with the consent of the candidate or his election agent], with the free exercise of any electoral right: Provided that— (a) without prejudice to the generality of the provisions of this clause any such person as is referred to therein who— (i) thereatens any candidate or any elector, or any person in whom a candidate or an elector is interested, with injury of any kind including social ostracism and ex-communication or expulsion from any caste or community; or (ii) induces or attempts to induce a candidate or an elector to believe that he, or any person in whom he is interested, will become or will be rendered an object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure, shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral right of such candidate or elector within the meaning of this clause; (b) a declaration of public policy, or a promise of public action, or the mere exercise of a legal right without intent to interfere with an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interference within the meaning of this clause.

2 As soon as may be after an Election Petition is presented and scrutinized as above, the Deputy Registrar shall place the same before the Chief Justice for orders under sub-section (2) of Section 80-A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

The Supreme Court examined Sections 81 and 86(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. Section 81 governs the presentation of election petitions, while Section 86(1) requires dismissal where an election petition does not comply with Sections 81, 82 (Parties to the petition) or 117(Security for costs). Relying upon G.V. Sreerama Reddy v. Returning Officer, the Court reiterated that Section 81(1) prescribes essential requirements, including presentation “by” the Petitioner. The expression signifies more than the mere delivery of a document to the Court.

The Court also considered whether Rule 7 of the Madras High Court Election Petitions Rules, 1967, was legally valid. Relying upon Jamal Uddin Ahmad v. Abu Saleh Najmuddin, the Supreme Court explained that High Courts possess incidental and ancillary powers necessary for the effective exercise of their jurisdiction. These powers include regulating administrative matters concerning the receipt and scrutiny of documents.

The Court held that Rule 7 regulated the manner in which election petitions were presented and received. It did not contradict Section 81, rather, it operated within the statutory framework. The decision therefore recognises the authority of High Courts to regulate procedural matters, provided their rules remain consistent with the governing legislation.

The Petitioner relied upon a CISF entry pass and CCTV footage to establish his presence in the High Court premises on 16 June 2026. The Supreme Court found that these materials did not establish personal presentation of the Election Petition. Proof of entry into the Court premises was not equivalent to proof that the Petitioner had personally presented the document. The Court also noted that the receipt for the security deposit under Section 117 had been issued in the name of the Petitioner’s Counsel. The ruling illustrates an important evidentiary distinction, establishing presence at a particular place does not necessarily prove that a legally required act was performed there.

The Court distinguished Dr. Vijay Laxmi Sadho v. Jagdish, where the relevant defect concerned a requirement under High Court Rules regarding the language of an Election Petition. Unlike that case, the present dispute involved a requirement expressly arising under Section 81(1). There, presentation by an advocate’s clerk in the immediate presence of the Petitioner had been treated as substantial compliance. The Petitioner in the present case did not establishes comparable circumstances. Accordingly, the Court agreed with the High Court and dismissed the Special Leave Petition.

CONCLUSION

The Judgment in V. Pon. Paneerselvam v. S. Regupathy & Others, reinforces the importance of procedural discipline in election litigation. It clarifies that personal presentation under Section 81(1) is mandatory and that non-compliance may result in dismissal under Section 86(1). The ruling also confirms that High Courts may regulate the administrative process of receiving election petitions through rules consistent with the statute.

Importantly, the Supreme Court did not decide the merits of the allegations concerning the returned candidate’s election affidavit or alleged corrupt practices. The matter was decided on maintainability. Ultimately, the Judgment reminds litigants and practitioners that the strength of a legal claim cannot substitute for compliance with mandatory statutory requirements. In election law, the path to challenging an electoral outcome is as important as the challenge itself.

TRISHMA KASHYAP

Legal Associate

The Indian Lawyer & Allied Services

Editor’s Comments

The Apex Court emphasized that election petitions may affect the validity of an electoral outcome. Consequently, compliance with statutory requirements cannot be dismissed as a technical formality. Since personal presentation was treated as a mandatory requirement, non-compliance attracted the consequences prescribed under Section 86(1).

SUSHILA RAM

Advocate and Chief Consultant

The Indian Lawyer & Allied Services